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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS -TAX LIMITATIONS-RIGHT OF TORT JUDG-
MENT CREDITOR TO MANDAMUS LEVY IN EXCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL MAXI-
MuM.-The Supreme Court of Missouri has finally corrected a long-stand-
ing error, and held that satisfaction of a tort judgment cannot be made
the basis of exception to the rule that a city cannot levy a tax above the
constitutional maximum. State ex rel. Emerson v. City of Mound City,
(Sup. Ct., Mo., 1934), 73 S. W. (2nd) 1017. The plaintiff Emerson had ob-
tained a judgment against the defendant city in a personal injury case, and
execution had been returned unsatisfied-the city having disbursed its en-
tire annual income in paying current expenses. The tax rate was already
at the limit set in Art. 10, sec. 11 of the Missouri Constitution, and plaintiff
sought to mandamus the city to collect sufficient additional tax to satisfy
his claim.
The immediate effect of the instant case is the overruling of State ex rel.
Pyle v. University City (1928) 320 Mo. 451, 8 S. W. (2nd) 73, State ex r'el.
Poole v. City of Willow Springs (Mo., 1916) 183 S. W. 589, and State ex rel.
Furby v. Continental Zinc Co. (1917) 272 Mo. 43, 197 S. W. 112 which
reached a directly contrary result. The decisions in these cases rested pri-
marly on Conner v. City of Nevada (1905) 188 Mo. 148, 86 S. W. 256. In
the Conner case, the plaintiff was not seeking mandamus at all, but a judg-
ment in tort. The defenses were advanced that the defendant city had al-
ready levied the maximum tax, which produced only sufficient income for
ordinary expenses in the current year, and that a judgment against the de-
fendant would constitute a debt which exceeded the limitation in Mo. Const.,
Art. 10, sec. 12, providing that no city shall be allowed to become indebted
in any manner to an amount exceeding in any year the income and revenue
provided for such year without the assent of two-thirds of the voters. In
upholding a judgment for the plaintiff, the court, ignoring the matter of
the tax limit, stated that the limitation on indebtedness applies only to con-
tract claims, construing the word "indebtedness" narrowly to include only
voluntary obligations which would conflict with the constitutional purpose
of preventing municipal extravagance. In the instant case it is pointed out
that the Conner case embodies the general American rule (37 L. R. A.
IN. S.] 1097 and cases cited) but that the rule applies only to the debt limi-
tation as a defense to the tort action-the court making the comment that
it has never been the practice to examine into the defendant's ability to pay
in an action seeking to establish liability.
The facts of the intervening Pyle and Poole cases, which resemble the
principal case, do not warrant the application of the doctrine of the Conner
case. If they are to be sustained at all, they must rest on their own foun-
dation. Evidently the Court came to that realization in the Pyle case, for
it supplied the argument that secs. 11 and 12 should be read together and
that the Conner case established a general exception in favor of the tort
judgment creditor-an exception which would then run through both of
the constitutional provisions and the statute which secures to judgment
creditors the right to mandamus a tax lexy within constitutional limits.
(R. S. Mo. [19291 sec. 1233).
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The Court in the present case vigorously assails all such reasoning. It
is shown that the only additional direct authority relied on in the Pyle and
similar cases is Menar v. Sanders (1916), 169 Ky. 285, 183 S. W. 949. But
that case is supported in its opinion only by the cases cited in 37 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1097, which deal with the debt limitation, all supporting the propo-
sition set forth in the Conner case, which is included.
The Court in the principal case goes on to point out, in relation to R. S.
Mo. (1929), sec. 1233, that there is no mention of tort judgment creditors,
all judgments standing on the same footing. In support of its contention,
the Court refers to the general legal principle that a cause of action is
merged in the judgment. But assuming a contrary Legislative intent, it
would have violated the constitution, for Art. 10, see. 11 cannot be abridged
by any state agency. It stands as a guaranty to the property owner that his
tax bill will not exceed a certain limit. A reading of the section inevitably
leads to the same conclusion, and it is well that the Court has finally repu-
diated its contrary position.
W. H. M. '36.
RAILROADS-ABOLITION AND SEPARATION OF GRADE CROSSINGS-A PoR-
TIONMENT OF COST.-Under a Tennessee statute the Commissioner of High-
ways ordered a railroad to construct a viaduct over a proposed state
highway and to pay half the cost. The railroad appealed the order as
unreasonable and arbitrary. The trial court set aside the order, but the
state supreme court reinstated it, refusing to consider the special facts
which the railroad had offered and upon which the trial court had found the
order unreasonable. Held: that the Tennessee Supreme Court erred in
refusing to consider the facts offered by the railroad in passing on the
reasonableness of the Commissioner's order. Nashville, Chattanooga, & St.
Louis R. Co. v. Walters. (1935) 55 S. Ct. 486.
The power of the state to compel the elimination of grade crossings at the
expense of the railroads in the interest of public safety is well settled. The
early statutes placed the whole expense of separating grades on the rail-
roads, and these were upheld in New York & N. E. R. Co. v. City of Bristol,
(1889) 151 U. S. 556. Present legislation in thirty states divides the cost
equally between railroad and public. A few states authorize the Commission
to apportion costs equitably. R. S. Mo. (1929) See. 5171. Cahill's Rev.
Stat. Ill. (1931), Chap. lila, p. 77, sec. 58. Following the Bristol decision,
these statutes have been invariably upheld. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v.
Minneapolis (1914) 232 U. S. 430; Erie R. Co. v. Board of Pub. U. Comm.
(1921) 254 U. S. 430; Lehigh Valley R. v. Bd. of P. U. Comm. (1928) 278
U. S. 24, 62 A. L. R. 805; State ex rel. Wabash Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm.
(1924) 306 Mo. 149, 267 S. W. 103; City of Chicago v. Ill. Commerce Comm.
'(1934) 356 Ill 501, 190 N. E. 896.
Orders of state commissions imposing such obligations on railroads are
reviewable by the courts to determine whether they are arbitrary or un-
reasonable under the particular circumstances and whether the commission's
findings have foundation in the evidence. Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Ill.
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